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dc.creatorCorrea, Juan A.
dc.creatorParro, Francisco
dc.creatorReyes, Loreto
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-13T15:36:44Z
dc.date.available2014-08-13T15:36:44Z
dc.date.issued2013-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11626/10026
dc.description.abstractPublic school teachers usually have centralized earning schedules, where their income depends mainly on experience. On the contrary, in private schools, there is high wage dispersion, and salaries respond mainly to teacher's performance. That dichotomous labor regulation encourages teachers with better unobservable skills to self-select in private schools because the likelihood of earning higher wages is higher than in public schools. The other side of the coin is the existence of \bad" teachers self-selecting in public schools. Using a representative sample of Chilean teachers, we estimate a two-sector Roy model to test self-selection. We find evidence of negative self-selection of teachers in public schools.
dc.language.isoIngleses_ES
dc.publisherMinisterio de Haciendaes_ES
dc.sourceDocumento de Trabajo. Ministerio de Hacienda. No. 3es_ES
dc.subjectDocenteses_ES
dc.subjectEducación Públicaes_ES
dc.subjectMercadoes_ES
dc.subjectRecursos Humanoses_ES
dc.subjectSelección del Personales_ES
dc.titleSelf-Selection in the Market of Teacherses_ES
dc.typeDocumento de Trabajo (Working Paper)es_ES
dipres.autorcorporativoMinisterio de Hacienda (Chile)es_ES
dipres.categoriageneralEducaciónes_ES
dipres.paisChilees_ES
dipres.ciudadSantiago de Chilees_ES
dipres.sectorEducaciónes_ES
dipres.sectorFinanzases_ES
dc.coverageRegión Metropolitana de Santiagoes_ES
dc.source.entityDirección de Presupuestoses_ES


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